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Mustafa Aydin, Armando Garcia Schmidt, Tabib Huseynov, 
Alexander Iskandaryan, Andrei Zagorski 
The protocols on the normalization of relations between Turkey and 
Armenia were signed in Zurich on 10 October 2009. Neither of the two 
issued a statement after the signing ceremony, since it could have gone 
beyond the finely balanced contents of the protocols. What are the 
expectations, hopes and fears associated with the reopening of the border 
and the normalization of relations? A report from four capitals and the EU. 
ANKARA 
by Mustafa Aydin 
The burden of history, geopolitical 
considerations, the influence of third parties 
and the convoluted nature of domestic politics 
made it impossible for Turkey and Armenia to 
have normal relations. And the road ahead is 
still tortuous because opposition parties in 
both countries have lashed out against their 
governments, and because third-party actors 
exercise considerable influence. 
Azerbaijan is an extremely important strategic 
partner, though it can also cast a veto on 
Turkey’s policy towards Armenia. This 
happened because Turkish politicians and the 
public were in favour of it. Turkey closed the 
land border with Armenia after the occupation 
of Azerbaijani territory. The fact that this 
situation still persists makes the Turkish 
public question its government’s intention to 
normalize relations with Armenia. In Turkey 
the man in the street tends to ask the same 
question as the opposition parties: “What has 
changed that leads us to be so magnanimous, 
and why should we accede to Armenian 
demands without getting anything in return?” 
However, there are several reasons why the 
two countries need to move towards 
normalization now. Part of the explanation is 
provided by the lessons that the main actors 
have drawn from last year’s conflict between 
Russia and Georgia. It demonstrated to 
Armenia that the region’s “frozen” conflicts 
are not so icy after all. Thus, in view of 
Azerbaijan’s burgeoning military procurement 
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programme and Turkish involvement in the 
training of its armed forces, simply waiting for 
the Karabakh problem to solve itself was not a 
feasible option. 
Azerbaijan came to similar conclusions. The 
initiation of a new round of hostilities over 
Karabakh might not achieve the desired result, 
since Russia has given a clear indication of 
how it would react. The conflict taught Turkey 
that unless it becomes more pro-active and 
somehow manages to pacify the region, the 
Caucasus might easily be overwhelmed by 
instability. 
Secondly, the election of President Obama and 
the policy lines he espouses encouraged both 
Armenia and Turkey to move towards 
reconciliation. And Russia, which to the 
dismay of the West has been pushing for 
better relations with Turkey, finally became 
more receptive towards a Turkish-Armenian 
compromise. 
The fact that Sarksyan needed a success story 
for domestic reasons and Erdogan for Euro-
pean and international consumption also 
helped. It went hand in hand with the 
appointment of Ahmet Davutoglu, the archi-
ect of the AKP’s “rhythmic diplomacy” and 
“zero problem with neighbours” policy, to the 
helm of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. While 
he was chief foreign policy adviser to the 
prime minister, Turkey began to pursue a 
more active role in its neighbourhood. As 
foreign minister he supported the rapproche-
ment with Armenia. And since Turkey was 
embroiled in a bitter domestic debate about its 
handling of the Kurdish question, the 
discussion of a foreign policy issue provided 
some respite to the government. 
The Turkish public has been deeply divided 
over the issue since it first hit the headlines in 
April 2009. Although sections of the foreign 
policy community are unhappy about the fact 
that another country can place constraints on 
Turkey’s foreign policy options, the Azeri 
cause still receives a great deal of support. 
Thus the Azeri government could easily 
become a game breaker by playing on Turkish 
sentiments. This became apparent in April 
when Turkey and Armenia announced their 
desire to improve relations. The Azeri reaction 
towards the idea of reopening the Turkish-
Armenian border without parallel progress on 
the Karabakh issue led to a staunch backlash 
in Turkey, and forced Erdogan to temporarily 
halt the negotiations. 
However, he managed to make a good job of 
explaining his position to Azerbaijan. As a 
result there have not been any more 
acrimonious comments from Baku. Criticism 
of the government’s actions among the 
Turkish electorate is now largely restricted to 
two opposition parties, CHP and MHP. 
 
 
YEREVAN 
by Alexander Iskandaryan 
The Armenian-Turkish rapprochement 
transformed the public discourse in Armenia 
quite dramatically. From September 2008, 
when President Sarksyan invited President 
Gül to watch a soccer match in Yerevan, up to 
the announcement of the road map and the 
signing of the two Armenian-Turkish protocols 
in October 2009, domestic Armenian attitudes 
to Armenian-Turkish relations underwent a 
complete transformation.  
Before 2008 two factors influenced Armenian 
attitudes to Turkey. The first was the historical 
memory of the Armenian genocide in 1915, a 
memory aggravated by Turkey’s denial that it 
actually took place. The second was the fact 
that Turkey’s reason for closing its border 
with Armenia back in 1993 had been the 
armed conflict between ethnic Armenians and 
Azeris in another country, i.e. Azerbaijan. 
Thus in Armenia Turkey was perceived as an 
ally of the Azeris. 
Obviously, all this caused Armenians to 
mistrust Turkey. However, this negative 
attitude was very general and rather vague. 
The border remained closed, people rarely 
visited the other side, there was little tourism, 
Access via CEEOL NL Germany
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cross-border trade was impossible, and 
cultural interaction virtually non-existent. To 
the average Armenian Turkey was a country 
that one knew from history books and not a 
modern state, let alone a neighbouring one. 
Armenia’s isolation from Turkey, and the fact 
that the negotiations between Armenian and 
Turkish officials and Swiss mediators were 
kept secret from the public, led to a situation 
which left Armenian society in a state of 
shock. One of the ruling parties, 
Dashnaktsutyun, left the ruling 
coalition after the announcement of 
the road map in April 2009, and 
joined the opposition merely in order 
to protest against Armenian-Turkish 
rapprochement. The August protocols 
were severely criticized in the media, 
which adopted a nationalist stance. 
Many commentators accused Turkey 
of double-dealing, and opponents of 
normalization organized a number of 
demonstrations. 
However, Armenians have criticized 
the protocols for a variety of reasons. 
The first and foremost motive is 
conservatism, a fear of changing 
anything, and certainly not the 
regional structure that Armenians 
have got used to over the last 15 
years. The second is the profound 
Armenian distrust of Turkey, which, 
it seems, is unable to distinguish 
between its own interests and those 
of Azerbaijan. If this is the case, then 
Turkey’s intentions as stated in the 
protocols are obviously insincere, 
and, if the truth were known, the 
issue of Nagorno-Karabakh will 
become a part of the agreements, if 
indeed it has not already been 
included in them, albeit in some 
secret kind of way.  
Some of these suspicions seem 
unfounded or even irrational, but they 
reflect the general level of anxiety in 
an isolated nation. The fact that 
Turkish leaders, who are trying to 
reassure both their own anxious 
electorate and that in neighbouring 
Azerbaijan, have made some rather 
vague statements about the parameters of the 
rapprochement process has not managed to 
restore Armenian confidence. 
However, the Armenian government seems 
rather buoyant. Despite public demonstrations 
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and a spate of criticism in the media, its 
mindset, which is focused on “opening borders 
and normalization without preconditions,” has 
so far remained unchanged. In view of the 
current coalition majority in the Armenian 
parliament, it seems likely that the president 
will be able to persuade parliament to ratify 
the protocols. 
There are no survey data to corroborate this, 
but it appears that antagonism to 
rapprochement with Turkey exists chiefly 
amongst intellectuals, nationalist groups, 
opposition politicians, journalists and young 
activists. Furthermore, the opponents of 
rapprochement do not represent the majority 
of the population. The Dashnaktsutyun Party, 
the nucleus of protests against the Armenian-
Turkish normalization process, only secured 
16 out of the 131 seats in the parliament in 
the 2007 election. Anti-rapprochement rallies 
attract a few thousand people at the most. 
Among the ruling elites there is no 
antagonism to normalization, and decision-
makers are swayed by pragmatic motives.  
 
 
BAKU 
by Tabib Huseynov 
Azerbaijan is watching the Turkish-Armenian 
rapprochement with a strange mixture of 
anxiety, confusion, and hope. Azerbaijanis see 
it mainly through the prism of its possible 
repercussions on the Nagorno-Karabakh peace 
process. However, there is no standard view 
on how Turkey’s new policies on Armenia 
might affect the Karabakh talks. Officially 
Baku wants Turkey to keep the borders closed 
as long as Armenia continues to occupy 
Azerbaijani territory. It maintains that the 
borders were closed in retaliation for the 
occupation of Azerbaijani territory, and should 
thus be reopened when it ends. 
Azerbaijani pundits have tried in various ways 
to explain what lies behind Turkish-Armenian 
rapprochement. Many think that the Turkish 
policy is first and foremost part of Ankara’s 
overall strategy of removing the obstacles 
standing in the way of EU membership, and 
its desire to be seen as a regional power. 
Others maintain that the Turkish move is part 
of a broader Western strategy to take Armenia 
out of the Russian ‘sphere of influence.’ And 
there are those who believe that Turkey is 
using the normalization talks with Armenia 
merely in order to stop Armenia from claiming 
that it was the victim of genocide. 
But regardless of Ankara’s perceived motives, 
the dominant attitude in Azerbaijani society is 
that Turkish proposals to reopen the border 
with Armenia before the resolution of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is tantamount to 
Turkey stabbing its closest ally, Azerbaijan, in 
the back. Only a handful of liberal 
commentators have argued that Azerbaijan 
might actually benefit from Turkey’s 
rapprochement with Armenia, since it would 
give Turkey greater political credibility and 
economic leverage to promote the resolution of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
Within the public discourse, it is possible to 
discern a visible difference in the ways in 
which Azerbaijani officials and the public 
reacted to Turkish-Armenian rapprochement 
before and after May 2009. Before there were 
fears that as a result of international pressure 
Turkey would give in to demands to reopen its 
border with Armenia without making any 
progress on the Karabakh conflict. Many 
people in Azerbaijan believed that in the wake 
of President Obama’s election, and in view of 
his endorsement of Armenian genocide claims 
during the election campaign, Ankara would 
reopen the border with Armenia by the end of 
April 2009 in an effort to avert censure from 
the new US administration.  
During the first half of the year the 
Azerbaijani media were full of reports and 
commentaries expressing their anger at 
Turkey’s “betrayal” of Azerbaijani interests. In 
order to demonstrate his objections to 
reopening the border, President Ilham Aliyev 
even turned down an invitation to attend the 
Alliance of Civilizations summit in Istanbul in 
early April in spite of phone calls from Turkish 
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President Gül, Prime Minister Erdogan and US 
Secretary of State Clinton. 
Criticism of Turkey decreased significantly 
after Erdogan’s mid-May visit to Baku, when 
he reassured the Azerbaijani leadership that 
Turkey would not act unilaterally without 
bearing in mind Azerbaijan’s interests. Since 
then this message has been repeated on 
numerous occasions by Turkish officials. 
It is an interesting fact that, since Turkish-
Armenian rapprochement is high on the 
international agenda, it has also turned the 
spotlight on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
This has raised Azerbaijani hopes that it might 
also benefit from the process. There is a 
growing perception among both regional 
players and the international mediators that 
reopening the Turkish-Armenian border will 
have to be accompanied by some kind of 
“tangible progress” in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
talks. 
Without such “progress,” even if it is defined 
in a rather vague kind of way, Turkey would 
hardly be able to ratify the 
protocols it has already signed 
and to reopen the border. Such 
progress would not have to 
start with an Armenian 
withdrawal from Azerbaijani 
territory, which has hitherto 
been the official Turkish 
position, but might be a 
framework agreement on the 
basic principles proposed by 
the OSCE Minsk Group. These 
would try to strike a balance 
between the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani positions. There are 
hopes that this scenario may be 
acceptable to Azerbaijan, and 
this would allow Turkey to 
reopen the border with 
Armenia without at the same 
time burning its bridges with 
Baku. 
However, there is a growing 
concern in Azerbaijan that, 
contrary to expectations, the 
Turkish-Armenian rappro-
chement may be detrimental to 
the Nagorno-Karabakh peace 
process, since Armenia might 
deliberately drag its feet on the 
question of basic principles in 
order to avoid fulfilling the 
commitments it made in the 
protocols, while at the same 
time putting the blame on 
Turkey and Azerbaijan for the failure to 
achieve tangible results. The OSCE Minsk 
Group mediators have stated repeatedly that 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Turkish-
Armenian rapprochement are parallel and 
mutually reinforcing processes. In order to 
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bring about a genuine and sustainable 
normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, 
it is important to put an end to the Nagorno-
Karabakh stalemate. An agreement between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan on a basic principles 
framework agreement by the end of the year 
could pave the way for progress on both 
fronts. 
 
MOSCOW 
by Andrei Zagorski 
On 1 September 2009 the Russian Foreign 
Ministry welcomed the forthcoming 
establishment of diplomatic relations between 
Armenia and Turkey and the proposed 
reopening of their common border. It 
expressed the hope that the “long-awaited” 
rapprochement would lead to meaningful 
accords, and noted that the two protocols 
which were to be signed did not appear to 
harm the interests of third parties. The 
anticipated establishment of good neighbourly 
relations between Yerevan and Ankara could 
help to reduce tensions, strengthen peace and 
security in the region, boost trade and improve 
social and economic standards. 
The formal language of the statement is not on 
a par with the enthusiastic welcome which 
came from the US and the EU. This reflects 
Moscow’s cautious attitude towards the 
rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. 
Since April 2009 officials in Moscow have 
been unwilling to express their emotions in 
public. Nor has there been a lively debate on 
the issue in Russia. Apparently Moscow is 
trying to understand what this rapprochement 
may mean for Russo-Armenian, Russo-Turkish 
and Russo-Azerbaijani relations, and for the 
South Caucasus in general. 
However, with the exception of a few liberal 
voices, most Russians tend to believe that the 
negative impact of anything which transcends 
the status quo ante bellum –and Armenian-
Turkish rapprochement is part of such a 
process– may outweigh any positive effects. 
They are of the opinion that the Turkish 
overtures to Armenia were very much the 
result of US pressure, which left Russia with 
little or no leverage on what was happening. If 
normalization continues, the outcome may 
well be rather sobering from a zero-sum 
perspective, since it would encourage Yerevan 
to drift further towards the West, and at the 
same time reduce Russian leverage. 
This becomes apparent when we consider 
what will happen once the Turkish-Armenian 
border is reopened. For more than a decade 
and a half Armenian overland links, with the 
exception of a minor route through Iran, were 
restricted to a few routes to Russia via Geor-
gia. However, these links were at the mercy of 
the progressive deterioration of Russo-
Georgian relations, which meant that air travel 
to Russia was the only available option. 
Reopening the border with Turkey would 
dramatically change this situation and would 
mean that Armenia no longer has to rely on 
the fragile link with Russia via Georgia.  
As a result of Armenian “drift” towards the 
“West”, Russian geostrategists believe that the 
status quo in the South Caucasus will change 
at the expense of the Russian Federation. They 
think that the strategic alliance with Armenia, 
where Russia has been the most important 
provider of security for the past two decades, 
is endangered, and that the status of Armenia 
as the most important military outpost of the 
Russian Federation in the South Caucasus is 
being called into question. This loss can 
hardly be compensated for by new Russian 
bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
On an official level Moscow does not appear to 
have succumbed to worst case scenarios as far 
as the forthcoming geopolitical and 
geostrategic consequences of the rapproche-
ment between Armenia and Turkey are 
concerned. However, it has not shown much 
enthusiasm for the process either, and has 
remained a passive observer of the bilateral 
negotiations between Ankara and Yerevan. 
At the same time Moscow has visibly 
intensified its political consultations with 
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Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan over the past 
year and a half. It seems that Russian 
diplomats are trying to understand what kind 
of regional political and economic balance will 
emerge from the Russo-Georgian war, the 
rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, 
as well as the cautious rapprochement 
between Russia and Azerbaijan. 
They are also trying to determine an 
appropriate way of preserving an important 
role for Russia in the region despite the 
perceived intrusion of extra-regional actors. In 
general the experts believe that, despite 
recent hesitancy and its genuine concerns, 
Moscow will not try to impede the Turkish-
Armenian rapprochement process. In fact it 
will probably try to become involved once it 
has been set in motion. The participation of 
Foreign Minister Lavrov in the signing 
ceremony in Zürich on 10 October 2009 is 
visible proof of this assumption. 
 
 
AND THE EU?  
by Armando Garcia Schmidt 
The official reactions of the EU and its 
member states towards the rapprochement 
process between Turkey and Armenia amount 
to no more than a cautious welcome. Whereas 
it is true that three leading EU politicians were 
present in Zurich on 10 October–French 
foreign minister Bernard Kouchner, Javier 
Solana, the High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, and 
Slovenian foreign minister Samuel Zbogar, 
neither the Swedish Presidency of the Council 
nor the European Commission were 
represented at the ceremony. 
 
And in fact other actors had provided a great 
deal of support for the process before it 
reached this point. Two years ago Switzerland 
began to mediate in secret between Armenia 
and Turkey. This Helvetian diplomacy led to 
the two protocols on the restoration of bilateral 
relations. The US also became actively 
involved. On his first trip abroad President 
Barack Obama encouraged Turkey to pursue 
its new policy of openness to its neighbours 
and to keep enhancing its role as a sheet 
anchor for stability in the region. Behind the 
scenes the US provided staunch support for 
Switzerland’s shuttle diplomacy. 
 
On 10 October Hillary Clinton and her Swiss 
counterpart intervened directly in order to 
mediate between the Armenian and Turkish 
delegations in a dispute sparked off by the 
wording of the planned announcements. The 
disagreements about the official statements on 
the day of the signing ceremony shows the 
fragility of the fledgling rapprochement 
process. A failure to sign the protocols in 
Zurich would have led to decades of stalemate. 
Whilst the American and Swiss foreign 
ministers were attempting to save the day, 
Sergei Lavrov and top European diplomats 
devised a new variety of soccer diplomacy, 
that is, they simply waited and teamed up to 
watch the game between Russia and Germany. 
 
There are two reasons why the EU’s attitude to 
the rapprochement process between Turkey 
and Armenia has hitherto amounted to no 
more than a benevolent kind of inactivity. On 
the one hand there is the EU’s unclarified 
relationship with Turkey, an area in which 
emotions tend to get the better of rational 
politics. The EU stands to gain from a Turkey 
whose foreign policy is cast in the European 
mould, which understands how it can generate 
long-term and profitable benefits for itself and 
its environment by deploying “soft power”. So 
whether or not one sees Turkey as a partner or 
as a member of the EU, this fundamental 
policy change should be welcomed and receive 
support. The EU and those who are especially 
sceptical of Turkish EU membership still find 
this difficult. The fear of being compelled to 
take action because Turkey is in the midst of a 
successful transformation seems to have 
clouded people’s ability to engage in rational 
decision-making. 
 
On the other hand the EU, despite or precisely 
because of the plethora of policy approaches 
which prompt it to look in the direction of its 
eastern neighbours (ENP, Black Sea Synergy, 
Eastern Partnership), continues to be unable 
to address basic issues of war and peace in its 
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vicinity. In the South Caucasus the way the EU 
deals with the latent conflicts is often con-
sidered to be unfocused and ambivalent. There 
is talk of stability, development and demo-
cracy, but in contrast to little Switzerland the 
EU is unable to come up with a strategic 
vision of how to resolve the conflicts and how 
to make a contribution to attaining this goal 
with the resources at its disposal. 
The EU is obviously the beneficiary of the 
developments now taking place. It will benefit 
from a peaceful Caucasus as a transit corridor 
for energy and from an Armenia which has 
begun to take its bearings from the West. And, 
whether it likes it or not, it is beginning to 
benefit from Turkey, whose successful foreign 
policy is now being conducted on European 
lines. 
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